WRITING COMPETITION ENTRY

Raising and Preservingfor Review Claimsfor Expanded
Protections for Criminal Defendants under the
New Mexico State Constitution

Raising and Preserving for Review Claims for Expanded Protections for
Criminal Defendants under the New Mexico State Constitution

by
Bruce Evan Thompson

Written originally
for
Professors
Michael Browde
and
Christian Fritz
State Constitutional Law
UNM School of Law
Spring 2003

66

Recourse to our state constitution as an independent source for recognizing and

protecting the individual rights of our citizens must spring not from pure intuition,
but from a process that is at once articulable, reasonable and reasoned."

'

Introduction

The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that each state has the "sovereign
right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by
the Federal ~onstitution."~Because states are bound by the Supremacy Clause and by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, by which the U.S. Supreme Court has applied
all but three of the protections granted in the federal Bill of Rights to the states: the rights
afforded under federal law represent the "minimum floor of rights below which state courts
cannot slip."4 Therefore, state supreme courts, as the interpreter of their own state constitutions,
,-

have the inherent authority to create the "ceiling" of individual rights and protections, at least
with respect to that state's government action.'
It is not difficult to see why the U.S. Supreme Court might explicitly decide to afford
only a bare minimum of federal constitutional protections. Applying long-standing principles of
federalism, the Court must be "ever mindful that its rulings apply throughout the land, and
accordingly [the Justices] must be sensitive to the disparities in local needs and local conditions
'State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 81: (Wash.1986).
PruneyordShopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,81 (1980). It is interesting to note that by citing the U.S.
Supreme Court at the outset for this proposition, 1 have intimated an implicit deference to that Court which this
paper intends to disavow.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the incorporation of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms and the Third Amendment right not to quarter soldiers in times of peace, ai.d has expressly held that the Fifth
Amendment right to indictment by grand jury does not apply against the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884).
See Developments in the Law--The Interpretalion ofState Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324, 1334
(1982).
3
It is 'theoretically interesting to hypothesize an application of greater state constitutional protections against the
federal government, on the basis of the Ninth Amendment's guarantee that the "enumeration ... of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
2
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from state to ~ t a t e . " ~
In other words, the U.S. Supreme Court must be careful not to tread too

c'

fiercely on individual states' ability to craft well-fitting laws and to exercise their inherent police
power as they see fit. Therefore, according to this view, the U.S. Supreme Court must balance
its duty to safeguard the basic protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution against its obligation
to respect the autonomy of the states and their local legislative processes.
On the other hand, state appellate courts, by virtue of their narrower scope of review and
their proximity to the subject of the legislation, have the luxury to craft constitutional protections
out of their own state constitutions that are better tailored to "local needs and local conditions"
than federal protections could ever be. While these state courts of course could never depart
below the floor of federal constitutional protections, each one has the power to create its own
framework above that floor, bestowing greater protections according to the values and ideals of
that state as reflected in that state's constitution, legislative history and common law. It is

-..

conceivable, then, that fifty active jurisprudential systems might co-exist, separate and
independent from the federal judiciary, each of which individually reviews its state constitutional
protections with whatever deference it sees fit to the corresponding federal jurisprudence.
The widespread advent of this "judicial federalism" is a relatively recent phenomenon
and its rise has been attributed to a backlash by state judiciaries against the Burger Court's
aggressive chipping away at civil liberties protections forged by the previous Warren court? It
is not surprising that, during the incorporation period of the 1960's, when the Warren Court was
expanding the scope of federal constitutional rights, civil rights litigants had little need to invoke
state constitutional provisions. However, with the shrinking of those same federal civil rights
protections under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, beginning in the 19703, state courts began
6

Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of ComlifulionalSpiril, 70 N.C.L.Rev. 1803, 1809-10 n.23 (1992).
G. Alan Tan, Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Western Stale Conslilulions in the American Constilulional
Tradition, 28 N . M . L. Rev. 191 (1998).
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to rediscover the importance of their own state constitutions in protecting individual liberties.'

"

As a response to the Burger Court's erosions of those earlier protections, Justice Brennan
exhorted:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be
allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for without it,
the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.9
According to Brennan's view, our liberties are not fully realized without a healthy and vigorous
interpretation of state constitutions by state appellate courts.
A major theme of this dynamic judicial federalism of course is an acknowledgement of

the ongoing "conversation in progress" between advocates and state courts about what the
precise scope of state constitutional protections will be.''

State courts cannot expand state

constitutional rights sua sponfe, which means that such pioneering expansions of state
7

constitutional protections require that particular issues be preserved at trial, raised for review,
and painstakingly briefed and argued on appeal. In the context of criminal defendants' rights in
particular and civil rights generally, the vitality of the expansion of state constitutional
jurisprudence depends entirely on the creativity and zeal with which advocates preserve and
pursue such previously unexplored state constitutional claims.
I intend for this paper to lay a basic groundwork for defense counsel in New Mexico to
use in the preservation and advocacy of criminal defendants' state constitutional claims. It bears
stating at the outset that perhaps the greatest pitfall for an advocate in this field is for one to

8

%n

Or more accurately, advocates began to urge state constitutional rights claims on state courts, and state courts were
then obliged to assess the merit o f those claims. Michael B. Browde, State v. Gomez ondthe Continuing
Conversation Over New Mexico's State Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 387 (1998).
9
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions andthe Protection ofIndividuolRights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
I0
David Henderson, Setting the Ground Rules for a Conversation in Progress, N.M. Bar J. July-Aug. 1997.
Browde, supra note 8,28 N.M. L. Rev. 387 (1998).

make the assumption that, because the New Mexico Supreme Court has refused to grant a
n

particular constitutional protection in the past, that mling cannot be successfully challenged in
the future.

For reasons that will become clear, New Mexico's "interstitial" approach to

constitutional jurisprudence permits (and in fact encourages) appellate review of earlier rulings
that were based solely on an interpretation of the federal constitution.

New Mexico Interstitialism

In State v. Gomez, I ' the New Mexico Supreme Court formally announced the adoption of
an approach to state constitutional jurisprudence the court called "interstitialism." There, the
defendant was charged in state district court with possession of a Schedule I controlled
substance. The trial court denied Gomez's motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his car

-

and fanny pack on the grounds that the search was conducted without a search warrant and
without exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.I2 Gomez was convicted, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Gomez had failed to preserve at the trial court stage his
objection that the search was invalid under Article 11, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution.
Having granted certiorari to address what was required to "fairly invoke" and preserve
for review a search and seizure claim under Article 11, Section 10, the Gomez court first
addressed the extent to which the court would defer to federal precedent in analyzing the state
constitutional claim.I3 Here, the Court announced its formal rejection of the "lock-step" analysis

'I

122 N.M.777,932 P.2d 1 (1997).

Gomez,I22 N.M.at 784,932 P.2d at 8.

r'\

" While the Court did not squarely address the federal issue (because the Fourth Amendment claim was not
properly before it), the search was clearly admissible under federal law. U.S. v. Ross,456 U.S.798, 102 S.Ct. 2157
(1982) (holding that where an ofticer has probable cause to search an entire vehicle, the officer may conduct a
warrantless search, without a showing of exigent circumstances, of every part of the vehicle and its contents,
including all containers and packages, that may conceal the object of the search).

as inconsistent with the jurisprudential approach expressed in Stare ex rel. Serna v. Hodges..I4
P

Under the lock-step analysis, state courts would automatically deter to the federal constitutional
interpretation when construing parallel (i.e. identical or substantially identical) provisions of the
state constitution. In other words, if the federal constitution protected a particular individual
right, then New Mexico courts simply followed the federal precedent; if the federal constitution
did not protect the asserted right, then New Mexico courts would follow that precedent without
independently addressing and interpreting the parallel provision in the New Mexico
~onstitution.'~
In Hodges, the Court held that it is "not bound to give the same meaning to the
New Mexico Constitution as the United States Supreme Court places upon the United States
Constitution, even in construing provisions having wording that is identical, or substantially so,
'unless such interpretations purport to restrict the liberties guaranteed the entire citizenry under

-

the federal charter."'I6 Given that the state supreme court is "the ultimate arbiter of the law of
New ~exico,"" the Gomez court followed the lead set in Hodges and expressly rejected the
lock-step analysis in favor of the "interstitial" approach.
In those cases in which the asserted right is protected under the federal constitution, the
interstitial approach in fact tracks the lock-step approach: The court looks first to the federal
constitution, and if the asserted right is protected, the inquiry ends and the state constitutional
claim is not reached.'' The interstitial approach diverges from the lock-step approach, however,

I4

n

89 N.M. 35 1,552 P.2d 787 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds, Sfale v. Rondrem, 89 N.M. 408,412,553
P.2d 688,692 (1976).
15
Comer. 122 N . M . at 782, 932 P.2d at 6. See e.g. Stalev. Garcia, 76 N.M. 171, 174,413 P.2d 210,212 (1966)
(referring to Article 11, Section 10 as "almost identical" to the Fourth Amendment).
l6 Id. at 356, quoting People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528,548,531 P.2d 1099, 1112 (1975).
" Gornez, 122 N.M. at 782, 932 P.2d at 6, quoting Hodges, 89 N.M. at 356, 552 P.2d at 792.
'"omez, 122 N.M. at 783,932 P.2d at 7. This is the reverse of the arguably more logical "primacy" approach,
which would be to analyze all state claims fint in order to determine whether the federal constitution is necessary at
all to intervene as a last resort between a state and an individual. See Hans A. Linde, Without ' ( h eProcess":
Unconrtitutional Law In Oregon, 49 0r.L.Rev. 125, 133-35 (1970) (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment "due

when the federal constitution does not protect the asserted right. In these cases, the court then
-\,

looks to the New Mexico Constitution to see whether its parallel provision provides more
expansive protection than its federal analog. If so, then the court is free to diverge from federal
precedent and determine the outcome under "independent and adequate" state grounds.19
It is widely believed that the adoption of the interstitial approach announced in Gomez
was of groundbreaking importance to a "mature jurisprudence."20

However, Gomez

interstitialism merely provides the vehicle by which greater state constitutional protections might
be explored and a divergence from the path of federal precedent might be forged. Again,
because state courts cannot expand state constitutional rights sun sponte, the true pioneers must
be those criminal defense lawyers and other civil rights advocates who assiduously preserve state
constitutional claims and argue them on appeal.

-.

Preserving Claims for Appeal

Justice Ransom in Gomez laid out the basic framework for litigants at the trial court level
to follow when preserving a state constitutional claim for appeal. The threshold question is
whether there is some established New Mexico precedent for construing the state constitutional
provision more broadly.

If so, then counsel must at a minimum invoke the constitutional

principle at issue and lay a sufficient factual basis for a ruling:
If established precedent construes the provision to provide more protection than
its federal counterpart, the claim may be preserved by (1) asserting the
constitutional principle that provides the protection sought under the New Mexico
Constitution, and (2) showing the factual basis needed for the trial court to rule on
the issue. This is no more than is required of litigants asserting a right under the
federal constitution, a federal statute, a state statute, or common law. That is,
--

n

--

-

process" and "equal protect~on"attacks on state action are both superfluous and moot when the state constihltion is
adequate to protect the asserted right.
19
See M~chrgonv Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038, 103 S.Ct. 3469,3475 (1983).
20
See e.g. Browde, supra note 8, at 387.

Rule 12-216 requires that litigants "fairly invoke" a ruling by the trial court in
order to raise that question on appeaL2'

.-

Under this "established precedent" rule, Gomez met the requirements of Rule 12-216(A) by (1)
stating in his motion to suppress that Article 11, Section 10 invalidates the search and seizure of
his car and fanny pack because the search was conducted "without a search warrant, [and
without] exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search;"22 and (2) developing the facts,
based on officer testimony, sufficient for a ruling that exigent circumstances were not present,
thereby bringing the case outside the scope of ROS?~ and within the scope of New Mexico cases
interpreting Article 11, Section
If there is no established New Mexico precedent on which to base a claim of independent
state constitutional protections, more is required of the advocate at the trial court stage:
[Wlhen a party asserts a state constitutional right that has not been interpreted
differently than its federal analog, a party also must assert in the trial court that
the state constitutional provision at issue should be interpreted more expansively
than the federal counterpart and provide reasons for interpreting the state
provision differently from the federal provision.25'
Because Gomez was decided in the context of a situation where trial counsel could rely on
established precedent, Gomez does not explore in detail what more would be required in the case
of a state constitutional claim that lacks such established precedent. The question for the
advocate then becomes: What constitutes "reasons for interpreting the state provision
differently" adequate to preserve the claim?

The Gomez court gives due deference to the

constraints trial counsel face in the heat of trial: "It is impractical to require trial counsel to
Gomez, 122 N.M.at 784,932 P.2d at 8.
Id. In oral argument before the trial court, Gomez cited State v. Coleman, 87 N.M.153,530 P.2d 947
(Ct.App. 1974) for the proposition that exigent circumstances were required to jcstify the officer's warrantless
search. Gomez held that this citation was sufficient to alert the trial court that Article 11, Section 10 provides more
expansive protection than, and should be interpreted differently from, the Fourth Amendment.
" U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982) (permitting a search of an automobile with probable cause
alone, whether or not exigent circumstances exist).
24 Gomez, 122 N . M . at 784-85,932 P.2d at 8-9.
l5 Gomez, 122 N.M.at 784, 932 P.2d at 8.
2'

l2

n.

develop the arguments, articulate rationale, and cite authorities that may appear in an appellate
'
I

brief."26 On the other hand, the Court requires something more than just the bare assertion that
the state constitutional provision at issue should be interpreted more expansively.
The Gomez court, in outlining past reasons that New Mexico courts have departed from
federal precedent, provides a rough guide for the practitioner to use in future cases. It is
important to note that the Court, unlike courts in other states, declines to dictate "specified
criteria for departing from federal interpretation of the federal c~unterpart.'"

In other words,

trial counsel are not bound to follow the criteria suggested in past rulings of the Court that
diverge from federal precedent, but rather are encouraged to be creative in their arguments and
analysis.28 According to the Court, past reasons for departure from federal precedent under New
Mexico law include: (1) flawed federal analysis;29(2) distinctive state c h a r a c t e r i ~ t i c sand
~ ~ (3)
undeveloped federal analogs.31 Again, this is clearly not intended to be an exhaustive list, as

-'.

footnote 3 explicitly declares. Footnote 3 refers the practitioner to Justice Handler's concurring
opinion in the New Jersey case, State v. ~ u n t , 'which
~
enumerates seven additional possible

I22 N.M. at 786,932 P.2d at 10.
Gomez, 122 N.M. at 784,932 P.2d at 8, footnote 3,
28 Id
29
Citing Campos v. State, 117 N.M.155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994) (rejecting the blanket federal rule that warrantless
felony arrests based on probable cause are constitutionally permissible in public places, holding that in New Mexico,
each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances); and Slate v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431,863 P.2d 1052
(1993) (rejecting the federal "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, holding that in NM, evidence searched
or seized in violation of Art. 2., Sec. 10 must be excluded at trial, whether or not the officer acted in reasonable
reliance on a defective warrant).
30
Citing State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 21 1, 784 P.2d 30 (1989) (rejecting the Gates "totality of the circumstances"
analysis in favor of the more exacting Aguilar-Spinelli test to determine whether an informant's tip has established
probable cause for issuance of a warrant, finding that New Mexico has not experienced the "rigidity and
technicalities" that led to the federal courts' abandonment of the Aguilar-Spinelli test); and State v. Sutton. 112 N.M.
449, 8 16 P.2d 518 (Ct.App. 1991) (critiquing the federal "open fields" doctrine, because unique patterns of property
ownership and land use in New Mexico might leave room for a reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore Art.
2, 5 I0 protections, even in open fields).
Citing Srute v. Atlaway, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103 (1994) (adopting a "knock-and-announce" requirement for
entry of a home to execute a warrant, even though the Fourth Amendment at the time had no analogous
requirement). A similar constitutional interpretation was adopted at the federal level one year later in Wilson v.
Arkomas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
" 450 A.2d 952,962-67 (N.J. 1982).
26 Gomez,

.?

rationales that might serve to justify departure from federal precedent: (1) differences in textual
'7

language?3 (2) legislative history?4 (3) preexisting state law? (4) structural differences between

(5) matters of particular state interest or local concern?'
the federal and the state c~nstitution?~
(6) state traditions:'

and (7) public attitudes.39 By citing to Justice Handler's concurring opinion

in Hunt, and other cases that suggest possible rationales for state courts to f o l l o ~ , 4the
~ Gomez
" Textual language can be relevant in either of two contexts. First, distinctive provisions of a state constitution may
recognize rights, such as the right to education, not identified in the federal Constitution. Second, the phrasing of a
particular provision in a state constitution may be so significantly different from the language used to address the
same subject in the federal Constitution that a state court should feel free to interpret its provision on an independent
basis.
34
Whether or not the textual language of a given provision is different from that found in the federal Constitution,
legislative history may reveal an intention that will suppon reading the provision independently of federal law. See
e.g. State v. Miyoski, 62 Hawaii 269,614 P.2d 915 (1980) (holding that the Hawaii Constitution, Art. I, Sec. lo,
intended to incorporate the self-incrimination protections provided by the Fifth Amendment as interpreted at the
time the state constitution was adopted, but not to incorporate the subsequent erosion of the federal standard).
Because state law is often responsive to fundamental concerns of liberty long before they are addressed by
constitutional claims, such preexisting case law can help to define the scope of the constitutional right later
established.
36 While the U.S. Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the federal golemment, state constitutions serve
only to limit the sovereign power which inheres directly in the people and indirectly in their elected representatives.
Hence, the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in a state constitution can be seen as a guarantee of those
fundamental rights and not merely as a restriction upon state actors. See State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 43 1,863 P.2d
1052 (1993) (adopting a 'fundamental rights' approach to the exclusionary rule under Article 11, Section 10, in stark
contrast to the federal 'inshumentalldeterreut' rationale).
37
This seems to be a restatement of Gomez's 'distinctive state characteristics' rationale. See e.g. State v. CardenasAlvarez, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225 (200 I) (noting the unique characteristics of New Mexico - i.e. its border with
Mexico and its long stretches of highway between major urban areas - in justifying the heightened requirement of
reasonable suspicion, rather than mere 'suspicious circumstances,' in validating a prolonged border patrol stop and
the Guits thereof. the federal rule notwithstandine).
", Justice Handler's concurrence in Hunt went even further. notine
that issues that implicate the management of state and local court systems, as well as strong state and local policy
favoring broad access to courts, can serve to justify more liberal rules of standing to allow individuals to vindicate
their constitutional claims.
38 Citing Slate v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535,423 A.2d 615 (1980) (emphasizing New Jersey's strong tradition of
protecting individual expressional and associational rights in holding that the New Jersey Constitution provided
greater protections for the right to free speech than those found in the federal Constitution); State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J.
53 I, 410 A.2d 666 (1979) (interpreting the state constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel as granting
more expansive protection than that fiund in the federal constitution because of firm policy regarding the proper
role of anorneys in criminal tr~als);Baker v. City ofFairbonkr, 47 1 P2d 386,399-401 (Alaska 1970) (emphasizing
Alaska's broad availability ofjury trial for petty offenses when state constitution was adopted); In re Advisory
Opinion lo the Senate, 108 R.I. 628,630,278A.2d 852,853 (1971) (Rhode Island's tradition of requiring twelveerson juries in criminal cases was implicitly read into the Rhode Island Constitution, Art. 1, Secs. 10, 15).
" Citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (holding that a broad privacy protection was mandated by
Alaskans' desire for individualistic lifestyles); District Attorney v. Watson, 38 1 Mass. 648,411 N.E.2d 1274
(holding that the death penalty is contrary to prevailing standards of decency in Massachusetts, as evidenced by the
absence of any use of death penalty in the Commonwealth since 1948).
40
Other cited cases include People v. P.J. Video, Inc, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y.1986) (citing textual
language; history of the adoption of the state constitution; structure and purpose of the state constitution;matters of
particular state or local concern; and distinctive attitudes of the state citizenry); Commonwealth v. Edmundr, 526 Pa.

''
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court has expressly encouraged counsel to be creative in raising and justifying new state claims.

.-.

The Vermont Supreme Court stated it this way: "The imaginative lawyer is still the fountainhead
of our finest jurisprudence.'*'

Avoidine the Pefia Trap

In Gomez, defense counsel relied on Coleman for the proposition that exigent
circumstances were required to justify the officer's warrantless search of a vehicle and its
contents.42 In Coleman, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that a showing of probable
cause alone, without a finding of exigent circumstances, did not provide the requisite foundation
for a warrantless search of a closed burlap sack located inside defendant's automobi~e.~~

Coleman was decided in 1974 - eight years before the U.S. Supreme Court decided ROSS" - in
lock-step with the federal rule that prevailed at the time.
However, prosecutors in Gomez relied on ~ e f i a , a~ case
'
decided in 1989 that adopted the

Ross rule, again in lock-step with (changed) federal precedent. Peiia held that discovery of a
roach clip with marijuana residue in the ashtray of defendant's car established probable cause to
search the entire interior of the vehicle, including a brown bag found within, pursuant to the Ross
exception to the warrant requirement.46 The PeAa court discussed only the protection afforded
under the Fourth Amendment a s interpreted in Ross, and did not undertake any independent
374.586 A.2d 887 (1991) (citing text of the state constitutional provision; history of the provision, including state
common law; related case law from other states; and policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local
concern, and applicability witbin modem state constitutional jurisprudence); and Slate v. Jewel/, 146 Vt. 221, 500
A.2d 233 (1985), lcitinn
textual lanauaee and histow ofthe state orovision: related case law &om "sibline" states:
.
and the application of economic and sociological research to state and local concerns).
Jewell, 146 Vt. at 228, 500 A.2d at 237.
42
Gomez, I22 N.M. at 781, 932 P.2d at 5.
43
Coleman, 87 N . M . at 155,530 P.2d at 949.
44
U S . v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, I02 S.Q. 2157 (1982) (extendig the automobile exception to the w m t requirement
to closed containers found within the vehicle).
4sS1a1ev. Peiia, 108 N . M . 760,779 P.2d 538 (1989).
46 Peria, 108 N.M. at 761,779 P.2d at 539.

-
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analysis of the protection afforded by Article 11, Section 10 or Coleman. In fact, neither Article
11, Section 10 nor Coleman is even mentioned in the text of PeAa, presumably because it was
considered unnecessary to discuss state common law decided in lock-step with federal precedent
that had since been overruled?'
The prosecution's reliance on PeAa, however, turned out to be misplaced. The Gomez
court, in committing itself to the interstitial approach, did not view itself to be bound by a case
that applied the lock-step approach to federal precedent:
The fact that PeAa would not require a showing of exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless search of an automobile does not compel us to hold that such
a showing is not required. We no longer follow United States Supreme Court
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in our interpretation of Article 11, Section
10. Therefore, Peiia is not controlling in this case.
The court concluded that New Mexico affords greater protection of individual rights than the
federal constitution in the area of search and seizure, and based that conclusion on its recognition

?.

of New Mexico's "strong preference for warrants" 48 and its determination that the mobile nature
of automobiles did not automatically create exigent circumstances in every case. However, there
was no way for defense counsel to know, prior to the outcome of Gomez, that Pefia was
vulnerable to attack on the ground that it failed to address the state constitutional claim.
This, then, is the PeAa trap: Because PeAa was good law at the time of Gomez's trial, his
defense counsel could easily have concluded that PeAa, which was decided by the New Mexico
Supreme Court only seven years earlier, was controlling. By expressly declaring that Peria was
not controlling, the Gomez court opened the door for the future rejection of any state law
precedent that follows the lock-step approach. After Gomez, it is now a trap to rely on otherwise

47

Indeed, according to the Court in Gomez, "Peiia represents the high-water mark of our interpretation of Article 11,
Section 10 in lock-step with the United States Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourth Amendment." Gomez, 122
N.M.at 787,932 P.2d at 1 1 .
.n. id.

sound New Mexico case law without first inquiring whether the precedent is vulnerable to attack
,r-\

under Gomez interstitialism. To avoid this trap, it is now incumbent on defense counsel not only
to know what New Mexico cases are relevant to a particular constitutional claim, but to
determine whether those cases were decided in lock-step with federal precedent, in which case
there is room for state constitutional claims to be advanced. I would argue that New Mexico's
interstitial approach to constitutional jurisprudence not only permits but in fact encourages
appellate review of earlier rulings that were based solely on an interpretation of the federal
constitution.

Conclusion
The advent of "judicial federalism" in general and the adoption of the interstitial
approach in particular have created a trend in New Mexico toward the articulation of greater,
A

more expansive protections of rights and privileges under the state constitution than federal
precedent provides.

By virtue of their special knowledge of local traditions, values and

conditions and their duty to ensure "the full realization of our ~iberties,"~~
New Mexico courts
have the concomitant duty to craft independent constitutional protections out of the New Mexico
Constitution that are better tailored to New Mexico than the federal protections could ever be.
A major theme of this Gomez interstitialism is the recognition of the ongoing

"conversation in progress" between advocates and state courts about what the precise scope of
burgeoning state constitutional protections will be.50 To engage effectively in this conversation,
advocates must be ever vigilant in assessing whether relevant state precedent has been decided
under the lock-step approach, in which case it is inherently vulnerable to challenge under Gomez.

49
-\

50

Justice Brennan, supra note 9, 90 Haw. L. Rev. 489.
Henderson, supra note 10, N.M. Bar J. July-Aug. 1997. Browde, supra note 8,28 N.M. L. Rev. 387.

Furthermore, when making these challenges under independent state constitutional grounds,
,F

.'

advocates must also in their briefing and argumentation be cognizant of the many possible
rationales that might serve to justify departure from federal precedent. With these considerations
in mind, the promise of a vital and creative state constitutional jurisprudence may be realized
through the vitality and creativity with which advocates bring state constitutional claims before
the judiciary.

